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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the Court's total acceptance of the Commissioner's interpretation,
this question might well arise in the future. If this problem is re-
solved and the word "requiring" is deleted from the Commissioner's
interpretation, the meaning of the phrase "away from home" would
become more equitable in application and more definite in meaning.
Thomas Ryan Goodwin
Labor Law-Public Employee's Right to Strike
P, a municipal board of education, obtained a temporary injunc-
tion restraining Ds, a public school teachers union and its president,
from engaging in a strike. By statute, all public employees and em-
ployee organizations were prohibited from striking. Ds ignored the
injunction which was made final shortly afterward. Criminal con-
tempt charges were then brought against Ds for violation of the
injunction. Ds urged that its members were not striking, but that
they had instead "resigned." Held, guilty of contempt. It has long
been a fundamental principle that a government employee may not
strike. This common law phobition is now reflected in statutory
form. Ds in asserting that a strike is not the same as the so-called
"resignations" are urging a distinction without a difference; the
argument is specious and sham. By engaging in a strike, Ds deliber-
ately violated the statute and defied the lawful mandate of the court.
Board of Education v. Shanker, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1967).
The principal case is simply one more addition to the long line of
authority which denies public employees the right to strike. As
stated in the case, "From time immemorial, it has been a fundamental
principle that a government employee may not strike."' This broad
prohibition has been applied with equal vigor to federal, state, and
municipal employees. By statute, federal employees are not only
denied the right to strike, but they are also prohibited from knowingly
becoming members of an organization that asserts the right to strike
against the government.2 Likewise, several states have codified
the proscription against strikes by public employees' and the states
Bd. of Educ. v. Shanker, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 548 (1967).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p-r (1964).
3 Currently, statutory provisions against strikes by public employees are
found in Fla., Hawaii, Mich., Minn., Neb., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., Tex., and Va.
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and municipal divisions who have no such provision need only point
to the substantial body of common law to brand a strike by public
employees illegal.4 Considerable vitality still remains in the words
of Calvin Coolidge spoken during the Boston police strike in 1919
when he stated: "There is no right to strike against the public at
any time, at any place, for any reason. This has long been accepted
by government employees, government workers and the public."'
Yet, strikes by public employees do occur, and lately their occur-
rence has been with ever increasing frequency.6 This fact, coupled
with the rapidly growing number of public employees,' prompts
considered reflection into the theories underlying the prohibition
against such strikes.
One of the often asserted theories is the sovereignty theory,8 which
reasons that while the people are the ultimate repository of authority,
they can act only through the sovereign state, which is the embodi-
ment of the will of the people. Therefore, the government employee
owes unquestioning loyalty and obedience to the state, for to disobey
the state is to disobey the will of the people which is a revolt against
the government, or tantamount to treason itself. The weakness of
this theory lies in its failure to differentiate the government as a
sovereign and as an employer. In its latter capacity the government
merely hires people to perform services, and in the normal course
of events disputes can arise which may be settled by negotiation,
conciliation, or arbitration. When these methods fail, employees may
resort to their ultimate weapon, the strike, in an attempt to enforce
their position. To brand this common pattern in labor relations as
a treasonous act by anarchists, merely because the employer is the
government, requires a considerable stretch of one's imagination.
The lack of a profit motive in public employers furnishes the grist
4 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 94
Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P. 305 (1949); Norwalk Teacher's Assn v. Bd. of
Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Miami Water Works Local No.
654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P. 2d 1018 (Okla. 1956).
5 Zack, Are Strikes of Public Employees Necessan?, 53 A.B.A.J. 808
(1967).
6 ZisxIND, ONE THousAND STRIKEs OF CoYERNmNT EMPLOYEEs 195-96
(1940).
7 It is estimated that by 1970, for every five employed persons there
will be one government employee; by 1980 the ratio will have increased to
one out of four. Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens,
16 LAB. L.J. 685, 687 (1965).
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for the second theory which denies the right to strike.9 The argu-
ment runs that since there is no profit motive in government, there
is no conflict between the employer and the employees for a greater
share of the profits such as is found in private industry. Therefore,
there is no reason for government employees to have the use of any
weapon to enforce claims for a greater share of the profits. But,
this argument is unconvincing when one realizes that the lack of
profit motive is compensated for by constant pressure for govern-
mental economy as well as for expanded services. Also, government
officials, motivated by a desire for advancement or the added personal
prestige which results from outstanding agency records often behave
much the same as private employers.
The third popular theory denying public employees the right to
strike reasons that public officers cannot surrender the authority
confided in them, because this authority is public property."0 From
the outset, one is wary of this notion for it implies that giving em-
ployees the right to strike should be equated to granting their every
whim. But, even if accession by public employers did follow a strike
by public employees, it is difficult to envision how the mere granting
of a ten cent per hour wage increase or the shortening of a working
day by fifteen minutes constitutes the surrender of a public officer's
authority. Acceding to the reasonable demands of one's subordinate
is not equivalent to the compromise of the superior's prerogatives.
Although upon close examination the popular theories prohibiting
strikes by public employees appear to be groundless and illogical,
they are repeated like sublime incantations with the true and practical
reasons for such prohibitions being left out of most judicial opinions.
Several states now have statutes prohibiting strikes by public
employees and prescribing severe penalties for violations. But, recent
study indicates that enactment of such statutes has not had a substan-
tial effect in preventing strikes. In fact, in New York, the average
number of public employee strikes increased after passage of the
no-strike law." The ineffectiveness of the anti-strike legislation
springs from a variety of reasons. First, public officials may hesitate
to invoke the penalties for fear of political repercussions.' 2 Even if
9 Id. at 155.
10 Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 298, 168 P.2d
741, 745 (1946).
,1 Krislov, Work Stoppages of Government Employees, 1942-59, 1 Q.
REV. OF EcoN. & Bus. 87 (1961).
12 Moberly, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966
Wxs. L. REv. 549, 551 (1966).
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a statute gives the administrator no discretion as to its application,
it may be disregarded, or it may be applied in a perfunctory manner. 3
The problem may even be sidestepped by refusing to denominate
cessation of work by an organized group of employees a strike. 4
But reluctance to enforce the statutes springs chiefly from the
realization that the immediate problem facing a strike-bound com-
munity is not punishment of the offenders but restoration of the
government services. If automatic discharge is included among the
penalties, enforcement of the anti-strike law may be practically
impossible because of the difficulty of replacing a large group of
skilled employees. 5 Therefore, the enactment of state statutes
which prohibit strikes by all public employees is not the answer.
For in most cases, these statutes have proved ineffective in pre-
venting work stoppages by public employees."
A bona fide objection to strikes by public employees stems from
the catastrophe that would be caused by cessation in certain essential
services-notably fire and police protection. "The spectacle of this
catastrophe is made to justify denial of the right to strike in the
entire public service."1 " But, the state's interest in preventing work
stoppages is not the same in all areas of public service. To clearly
illustrate this, one need only compare the effect of a strike by the
employees of a city municipal golf course to the effect of a strike
by city policemen. Public health and safety are not involved in the
former. 8 Likewise, a strike by private employees engaged in work
vital to the national defense would probably be more dangerous to
the public than a dispute among the employees of a public school
system. 9 It is equally incongruous to permit a utility worker for a
13 Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 Hnv. L. REv. 391,
396-97 (1961).
14 Id. at 397.
15 Id.
16 West Virginia has no statute which prohibits strikes by public em-
ployees. But, two opinions of the West Virginia Attorney General clearly
state that the rights of collective bargaining, closed shop, and strike do not
exist with employees of government at the state, county, or municipal level
in West Virginia. However, all public employees can join any association or
labor organization and cannot be discriminated against because of this mem-
bership. 49 Ops. W. VA. ATr'v GEN. 448, 452 (1962), 51 Ops. W. VA. ATr'Y
GEN. _. As volume 51 is not yet in print, the page number is unavailable.
However, when volume 51 is published, the opinion will be found therein
in a letter directed to James M. Sprouse Feb. 23 1966.
17 Baldwin, Have Public Employees the Right to Strike? - Yes, 30 NAT'L
MuN. REv. 515 (1941).
18 Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548,
550 (1957).
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private employer the right to strike and imperil the welfare and safety
of the public whereas the same man working for a government-
operated utility would not have the right to strike.2" The list of
anomalies that could be pointed out would be endless.
The logical solution to the many ludicrous situations that exist is
the classification of different areas of public employment into cate-
gories which establish or deny the right to strike according to the
nature of the employment. A test which could be used in the nature
and gravity of the consequences resulting from a strike by that area
of employment. Because of the serious consequences following a
strike by policemen, firemen, hospital workers, and others similarily
situated, these workers should be placed in a category which
would absolutely be denied the right to strike.' To compensate the
employees in these vital areas for not having the right to strike,
compulsory arbitration could be substituted. This would be analogous
to agreements in the private employment area where compulsory
arbitration serves as the quid pro quo for a non-strike clause.
Although the public employee can point to no decision, save one, 2
or legislative enactment which campions his right to strike, there
is a growing body of sentiment evidenced by executive orders which
make some attempt to equate his lot with that of the private em-
ployee. The federal employee's greatest victory came with a presi-
dential executive order in 1962.23 This order directed federal
agencies to grant qualifying employee organizations recognition.2
Likewise, municipal ordinances and executive orders by governors
and mayors have protected the right of state and municipal employees
to join labor organizations.2" These beginnings, however slight, do
represent a trend to afford public employees some of the rights which
have been long enjoyed by private employees.
Ironically, in an opinion in which the Attorney General of West
20 Rains, supra note 18, at 549.
21 Comment, Right of Public Employees to Strike, 16 DE PAUL L. Rrv.
151, 164 (1967).
22 Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 355 P. 2d 905, (1960).
23 Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962), 5 U.S.C. § 631N. (1964).
For an analysis of this executive order see Barr, Executive Order 10988:
An Experiment in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,
52 CEO. L.J. 420 (1964).
24 The term employee organizations was broadly defined within the or-
der, but it specifically excluded any organization "which asserts the right to
strike against the government of the United States or any agency thereof."
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Virginia specifically denied public employees the right to strike, a
summary of their plight is found. The attorney general pointed out
that public employees have struggled from early times to improve
their working conditions, wages, and hours of labor with history
recording the fact that public employers at every turn in the early
days attempted to thwart their efforts. Only the necessity of main-
taining a labor supply, public opinion, and the concessions won by
private employees forced the public employer to grant more favor-
able employment conditions.26
True, some concessions have been won by public employees, but
the rate of their victories has been painfully slow. To a large extent,
their progress remains blocked by the board common law rule which
prohibits all public employees from engaging in a strike. The rule
still stands despite numerous court tests. Even the theories for the
rule, illogical though they may be, continue to survive with tenacity.
The states which have dealt with the problem of public employee
strikes have merely codified the common law prohibition. The
deterrent effect of such statutes has been negligible. All urgings to
adopt a common sense approach by denying the right to strike to
only those public employees engaged in services vital to the com-
munity's health and safety have gone unheeded. A rule of law which
denies the right to strike to all public employees is no more equitable
than a criminal law statute which calls for the same punishment
irrespective of the crime. But, only when this is realized can the
public employee hope to gain any of the rights which have long
been protected and enjoyed by the private worker.
Peter Thomas Denny
Parental Immunity-Its Application and Future
P, an unemancipated infant, brought an action by his next friend
and mother seeking to recover from D, his father, damages for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Evidence sur-
rounding the mishap was conflicting and disputed. The jury however
evidently believed P's version. P testified that he was driving since
his father was intoxicated. D had been asleep in the front seat of
the car but was subsequently awakened by a bump in the road.
28 49 Ops. W. VA. ATT'y GEN. 448, 449 (1962).
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